The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a Warning Letter on April 12, 2017 requiring an explanation of how St. Jude Medical plans to correct and prevent cybersecurity concerns identified for St. Jude Medical’s Fortify, Unify, Assura (including Quadra) implantable cardioverter defibrillators and cardiac resynchronization therapy defibrillators, and the Merlin@home monitor.
The Warning Letter follows a January 2017 FDA Safety Communication on St. Jude Medical’s implantable cardiac devices and the Merline@home transmitter. The safety alert identified that such devices “contain configurable embedded computer systems that can be vulnerable to cybersecurity intrusions and exploits. As medical devices become increasingly interconnected via the Internet, hospital networks, other medical devices, and smartphones, there is an increased risk of exploitation of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, some of which could affect how a medical device operates.” FDA conducted an assessment of St. Jude Medical’s software patch for the Merlin@home Transmitter and determined that “the health benefits to patients from continued use of the device outweigh the cybersecurity risks.” Consequently, FDA’s safety alert provides recommendations to healthcare professionals, patients and caregivers to “reduce the risk of patient harm due to cybersecurity vulnerabilities.”
The following month, FDA conducted a 10-day inspection at St. Jude Medical’s Sylmar, CA facility and concluded that St. Jude Medical has not adequately addressed the cybersecurity concerns. Notably, FDA observed failures related to corrective and preventive actions (CAPA), controls, design verification and design validation.
In one instance, FDA found that St. Jude Medical based it’s risk evaluation on “confirmed” defect cases and not considering the potential for “unconfirmed” defect cases and therefore underestimated the occurrence of a hazardous situation related to premature battery depletion. Moreover, FDA found that St. Jude Medical failed to follow its CAPA procedures when evaluating a third party cybersecurity risk assessment report. Finally, FDA found that St. Jude Medical’s management and medical advisory boards did not receive information on the potential for “unconfirmed” defect cases and were falsely informed that no death resulted from premature battery depletion issue.
For all instances, FDA stated that while St. Jude Medical provided details on some corrective actions, it failed to provide evidence of implementation and was therefore deemed inadequate by FDA.
On October 11, 2016, St. Jude Medical initiated a recall for Fortify, Unify, Assura (including Quadra) implantable cardioverter defibrillators and cardiac resynchronization therapy defibrillators due to premature battery depletion. Despite the recall, FDA noted that some devices were distributed and implanted. Again, FDA was unable to determine whether the St. Jude Medical’s corrective actions were sufficient because St. Jude Medical failed to provide evidence of implementation.
Design Verification and Validation
In addition, FDA found St. Jude Medical failed to ensure that “design verification shall confirm that the design output meets the design input requirements,” and failed to accurately incorporate the findings of a third-party assessment into updated cybersecurity risk assessments for high voltage and peripheral devices like the Merlin@home monitor. Specifically, the Merlin@home monitor’s testing procedures did not require full verification to ensure the network ports would not open with an unauthorized interface. Further, the cybersecurity risk assessments failed to accurately incorporate the third party report’s findings into its security risk ratings. Also, even though the same reports identified the hardcoded universal unlock code as an exploitable hazard for the high voltage devices, St. Jude Medical failed to estimate and evaluate this risk.
For all violations, FDA stated that while St. Jude Medical provided details on some corrective actions, it failed to provide evidence of implementation and was therefore deemed inadequate by FDA. FDA has given St. Jude Medical 15 days to explain how the company plans to act on the premature battery depletion issue (despite related injuries and one death) as well as the improper focus on “confirmed” cases, and the distribution and implantation of recalled devices. FDA warns that St. Jude could face additional regulatory action if the matters are not resolved in a timely manner.
The Warning Letter, together with the January 2017 Safety Communication and a December 2016 Guidance on Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (which we have previously summarized here and here), demonstrates FDA’s continued scrutiny on the cybersecurity of medical devices. It appears that FDA is trying to communicate the need for device manufacturers to incorporate cybersecurity checkpoints throughout a product’s lifecycle to prevent patient harm and potential regulatory action. Not a bad idea for an increasingly tech-savvy world.